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Abstract
We introduce a technique for tracing a class of “man in the middle” TCP spooﬁng attacks. The technique works by
embedding a traceroute-like mechanism, which we call subliminal traceroute (ST), in the acknowledgment stream of an
active TCP connection. We consider the design considerations of ST and show that the attacker can take an active role to
defeat our method. We conclude by suggesting future work on ST that may make it more difﬁcult to defeat.
1 May 2, 20001 Introduction
In this Section, we discuss the problemknownas TCP spooﬁngand past work that addresses the problem. We also attempt
to motivate our approach to tracing spoofed connections as opposed to preventing them as in the past work.
1.1 The Problem
TCP spooﬁng attacks have been widely discussed by others in the literature.[Mor85, Bel89] Most of these discuss attacks
that hingeuponthe guess-abilityof initial TCP sequencenumbers(ISN) so that an arbitraryhost can exploit an address-based
trust relationshipto establish a client write-onlyTCP session. The session is client write-onlybecause the server will respond
to the claimed IP address of the client which will not be routed to the attacking client, and thereforethe client will not receive
any of the server’s responses unless it is on the route from server to client. Many operating systems have made this attack
much more difﬁcult by using randomly generated initial sequence numbers thereby requiring the attacker to receive at least
one packet (SYN-ACK) from the server to carry out the attack.
We consider a less general TCP spooﬁng attack where guess-ability of ISN’s is not an issue. The attacker, Mallory, sits
between the client, Alice, who he wishes to impersonate and the target server, Bob. We assume that Mallory is able to read
packets fromBob boundto Alice and also cause either the networkto dropthe packet or Alice to ignorethe packet. As shown
in Figure 1, Mallory can then create a TCP connection to Bob while masquerading as Alice. In this case, Mallory may not
be exploiting trust relationships as in the past work[Mor85], but instead Mallory may just be trying to hide his true identity
(IP address) from Bob. Physically, Mallory may accomplish this attack by controlling a host on the route between Bob and
Alice or by using one of the routing elements between Bob and Alice to redirect TCP packets from a spoofed stream to him.
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Figure 1. A TCP spooﬁng man in the middle attack allows Mallory to
createabidirectionalTCPstreamwithBobwhilemasqueradingasAlice.
1.2 Past work
1.2.1 Source Authentication
The most common work in the area of determining the source of network trafﬁc is source address authentication such as
in IPSec[Atk95]. The IPSec protocol allows for a digital signature to authenticate the source address (and integrity) of
2 May 2, 2000each packet. The problem with such schemes is that it isn’t clear that each packet deserves such a high expense procedure.
Furthermore, if a host’s key material is somehow covertly compromised then spooﬁng attacks are still possible leaving us
with all of the old spooﬁng problems. Another point is that although the signature authenticates the source address, the
scheme does not provide any other information such as a trace that might help trace an attack in a forensic situation.
1.2.2 Tracing packets
Threepastworksexistthataredevotedtotracingspeciﬁednetworkpacketstotheirpointoforigin. TheyareDoSTracker[CD97],
the intrusion detection and isolation protocol (IDIP)[Row99], and Mansﬁeld’s trackingprotocol[MOT
+99]. In the remainder
of this section, we will discuss how each of these work and some of their limitations.
DoSTracker[CD97], written by MCI, does a directed search across a network of routers looking for packets bound for a
target network and claiming to have a certain source address. DoSTracker is used by MCI to trace denial of service attacks
suchassmurfattacks[CA-98]. Unfortunately,DoSTrackerrequiresthat thenetworkinfrastructurebehomogeneous(allCisco
routers) and that the tracing person have full control of each router.
DoSTracker does its directed search by starting with the edge router of the target network and setting a “trap” for a packet
that represents the denial of service attack in progress. When the trap goes off, the source interface that the packet arrived on
is reported, and DoSTracker moves on to all routers that can directly communicate to that interface. The traps are set again
and the search continues. Obviously,this approachonly works while an attack is active and requires trappingat least as many
packets as there are hops to the source of the attack.
IDIP and Mansﬁeld’s tracking protocol are very similar so I will refer to both of them as IDIP. The main difference
between the two approaches is that IDIP looks for packets that match a speciﬁc criteria passing a router whereas Mansﬁeld’s
approach tries to correlate ﬂows of packets based on RMON-like counts of types of packets seen by the router. IDIP uses a
router modiﬁcation to trace ﬂows of packets. It does this in a way similar to DoSTracker in that the trace begins at the IDIP
routers nearest (by network topology) to the attacked network. The router that has seen the packets reports it, and the trace
continues with that router’s neighboring IDIP routers. Another difference between IDIP and Mansﬁeld’s work is that IDIP
attempts active response by allowing IDIP routers nearest the source of the attack to ﬁlter the malicious packets.
Each of these approaches may be capable of tracing a stream of spoofed TCP packets as in our problem statement, but
each has certain limitations in this regard. DoSTracker with trivial modiﬁcation could trace the stream, but since we are
dealing with a “man in the middle” attack, the attacker may have already subverted one or more routers. In this case, the
router may be conﬁgured to “lie” to DoSTracker and never set the requested traps. IDIP and Mansﬁeld’s work might work
as well, but both require signiﬁcant modiﬁcation to the network infrastructure and are therefore not immediately applicable.
Also, these techniques require knowledge that an attack is occurring and are too costly to run for any signiﬁcant number of
packets.
Another similar past work is the Firewalk tool[SG98]. Firewalk can perform traditional traceroute functionality using
ICMP, UDP, or TCP. The tool can be used to determine network traces behind a traditional packet ﬁltering ﬁrewall. While
Firewalk can do a traceroute using TCP packets, our work is different in that it embeds the tracing into an active TCP stream.
1.3 Why Trace?
In most networks, an address is usually considered to be the one identiﬁer that uniquely refers to an entity. Unfortunately,
in IP addressing this is not necessarily true. For instance, there are private address spaces such as 10.0.0.0 where many
disparate networks use those addresses to refer to their hosts and then use network address translation (NAT) to connect to
other networks. In this case, even an authenticatedaddress of 10.0.0.1would be of very little use because we would not know
the network the host was on. A trace may take us only back to the NAT gateway, but this is still much better than the internal
address! Furthermore, NAT may be used in several layers thereby requiring several hops of a trace to uniquely identify a
host. We understand that conventional tracing does not penetrate NAT borders, but we use this an example of how a trace
may be preferableto a single address. In our work, we do not claim to address the problemof tracing throughNAT gateways,
but we include this as an example of the insufﬁciency of the IP address to uniquely identify a host.
There is an even better reason for consideringa trace useful. A trace can be wrong but not completely so. For instance, the
last few hops of a trace may be wrong or unobtainable, but we may be able to trust the trace only as far back as the attacker’s
Internet service provider, A trace therefore provides levels of accuracy whereas a wrong address is likely to be completely
wrong. The reason for this is if the attacker can lie about his IP address why not lie in a big way so as to avert attention
elsewhere? On the other hand, it may be very difﬁcult to subvert enough routers to make them lie about substantial portions
of the trace.
3 May 2, 20002 Our Approach
Ourapproachis tobuilda traceroute-like[KS94]mechanismintoanactiveTCP streamsothata servercancollecttraces by
modifying an active TCP stream. This approach requires no modiﬁcations to the network infrastructure but has weaknesses
of its own as we shall see.
Traceroute works as shown in Figure 2. By sending UDP packets to a host with successively increasing time to live (TTL)
values, we cause the routers along the path to reply with ICMP time exceeded messages when the TTL expires on a packet.
When the TTL becomes great enough that the host receives the UDP packet, the assumption is that the host is not listening
on the packet’s destination port and therefore the system replies with an ICMP port unreachable message. This signiﬁes the
end of the trace.
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Figure 2. The traceroute protocol works by using successively larger
time to live’d UDP packets sent to the target host.
An obvious approach to tracing a man in the middle spoofed connection is to just use traceroute to attempt a trace.
Unfortunately, this easily defeated as the attacker can choose to allow the UDP packets to continue on to their original
destination. In this case, the route will lead to the host that is being imitated, not our attacker.
Our approach is to perform a traceroute inside a TCP stream so that if the attacker is redirecting TCP packets headed for
a spoofed client or consuming the TCP packets prematurely, the trace will indicate it and presumably lead us to the attacker.
We do this by setting the TTL low on every other ACK sent by the TCP state machine. When a low TTL ACK times out, the
remote router responds with a ICMP time exceeded packet that is then captured by the host. We allow TCP to compensate
for and resend the lost ACK as part of its reliable service.
Note that it is more difﬁcult for our attacker to simply ignore the packets in our mechanism because they are actually part
of the TCP stream in which we wants to participate. The only distinguishing characteristic of the packets used in ST is an
occasional TCP acknowledgment with a low TTL.
4 May 2, 20002.1 Design and Implementation
The ST system was designed aroundthe socket API in the Linux 2.2.10kernel. Our additions to the socket API allow user
mode processes to conﬁgure which TCP sockets to trace, and the kernel socket structures provide a convenient abstraction
for storing state about each trace in progress.
To allow processes to specify which TCP sockets to trace, we added a new socket option, SOCK_SUBLIM,to the set-
sockoptsystemcall. BysettingSOCK_SUBLIMto0(thedefault),notraceisdoneonthesocket. SettingSOCK_SUBLIM
to 1 will enable the tracing functionality which we will soon describe. Other values are allowed so that different trace strate-
gies may be added. For instance, if the TCP stream is expected to be short-lived, a more aggressive trace style may be
activated. We have modiﬁed a version of SSH[Ylo95] to set this socket option.
To implement ST, we modiﬁed the portion of the TCP implementation that sends acknowledgments. To this part of the
code we added a simple state machine (shown in Figure 3) that dictates the TTL set on each acknowledgment sent by the
system. Each edge has a two lines associated with it—the top line is the ﬁring condition for the edge and the bottom line is
the action taken when the edge is traversed. Note that each edge has an implicit ﬁring condition: a TCP ACK is ready to be
sent.
Init
i < 3 
 i++ 
TraceAck
i >= 3 
 T=1; ttl=T Done NormalAck
True 
 T++ ; ttl = 255
T = 255 T < 255 
 ttl = T
Figure 3. The ﬁnite state machine that determines the behavior of the
subliminaltraceroute. The topline oftheedge label represents the ﬁring
condition while the bottom line represents the action taken during the
transition.
i and
T are per socket variables and initialized to 0 at time of
socket creation.
The values of most of the constants in the state machine were chosen somewhat arbitrarily. We let 3 ACKs go by unmod-
iﬁed so that there is plenty of trafﬁc for the TCP handshake to proceed as normal, and the TCP stream will get established.
After this initial stage, the ﬁrst ACK is sent with a TTL of 1, and every other ACK is then sent with the next higher TTL
value. It is important to note that the variables referenced in the state machine are kept separate for each socket in its own
data structures. The value of 255 was used as it is the maximum value for a TTL in IP.
The resulting ICMP time exceeded messages are then collected with Tcpdump[Lab]. The source addresses of the ICMP
messages are the trace between the server and the client. Packets from multiple simultaneous streams can be distinguished
by looking at the message’s contents to ﬁnd the triggering TCP packet’s addresses and ports.
2.2 Tradeoffs
There are many tradeoffs in the design and conﬁguration of ST. The state machine controlling the trace can be modiﬁed
to do a more aggressive trace by reducing the initial waiting period and sending multiple low-TTL packets at once instead of
for every other ACK. Also, the state machine could be modiﬁed to do many low-TTL ACKs at ﬁrst so that the trace is done
very aggressively.
I chose not to send ACK’s in parallel with the TCP stream because it might have interfered with the TCP state machine by
causing side effects in the kernel code. However, doing so would allow for a fast trace instead of the current implementation
which requires
n
u
m
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r
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f
h
o
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s
+
3acknowledgmentcycles to occur to complete the trace. This might come into play if one
was tracing HTTP requests where there may be few acknowledgments sent back and forth, and hence too few ACKs may be
exchangedfor the trace to complete. Our system works ﬁne in most interactive login sessions because each character sent by
the client calls for an acknowledgment.
5 May 2, 2000Other design tradeoffs involve implementation details such as our choice to modify the kernel itself. It should be possible
but more difﬁcult to create a kernel module that sits between the driver module and the IP stack that performs a subliminal
trace. In this case, it might be more difﬁcult to implement control over which TCP streams are traced.
Another problem with ST is that there is no guarantee of correctness of the trace. For each TTL value, we only send one
ACK, and thereforeif any ICMP time exceeded packet is lost, the trace will be missing a host. Also, time exceededmessages
may return out of order causing the trace to have certain hops listed in the incorrect order.
3 Results
We have implemented the ST system and demonstrated that it works in an SSH daemon modiﬁed to enable tracing. After
a login, each packet sent by the client causes the next hop of the trace to be captured by script running Tcpdump. By sorting
the ICMP time exceeded messages by the destination address found in the packet payloads, we can reconstruct a trace for a
given peer even if multiple traces occurred simultaneously.
3.1 Defeating the Trace
Unfortunately, we also discovered a mechanism by which the attacker can defeat the ST mechanism. To do this, we
capture all IP packets with TTL equal to one, drop the packet, and reply with an ICMP time exceeded message with source
address spoofedto appear to come fromsome other router. Similarly, we can do this for all packets with TTL
￿
n to simulate
the last
n hops of a faked path.
As a proof of concept, we modiﬁed the same kernel used to implement ST to simulate fake routers that immediately
precede the host. We changed the IP layer of the kernel so that IP packets with TTL below some threshold were dropped
and an ICMP time exceeded message was sent in response. One instance of this technique replied to
T
T
L
=
1packets with
ICMP messages apparently from a host at the National Security Agency. Similarly,
T
T
L
=
2packets appeared to time out
at a Central Intelligence Agency host. This made the last two traceroute hops preceding the modiﬁed host to appear rather
comical. Ofcourse, a realhijackercoulduse this techniqueto fakethe tracebetweenhimselfandthehost heis impersonating.
If implemented naively, it is possible to detect faked route. Since the same host is simulating a number of routers to
send false time outs, the delay times observed in a traceroute command should be nearly the same. In order to overcome
this, a robust implementation would simulate the increasing latency of successive routers along the path. This could be
done by adding variable delays based on path measurements to the implementation, but it would greatly complicate a kernel
implementation as it would require scheduling the sending of ICMP time exceeded messages.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated a subliminal traceback technique in TCP streams for tracing “man in the middle” attacks to their
source. Althoughwe have also founda way for the attacker to defeat the trace, we still believe it raises the bar for a would–be
attacker as he would have to either drastically modify his host by modifying the kernel or drivers to reject low-TTL’d TCP
packets or by somehow intercepting low TTL’d packets before they arrive at the host.
Forfuturework,we believethat bymeasuringhoptimesona routeusingconventionaltracerouteandthencomparingthem
with times for a subliminal traceroute, we can make it more difﬁcult to fake a trace as described above. Another possibility
for future work involves continually doing a subliminal traceroute in a TCP stream with the goal of detecting TCP hijacking
attacks.
References
[Atk95] R. Atkinson. RFC 1825: Security architecture for the internet protocol. http://www.cs.purdue.edu/
homes/clay/papers/ipsec/rfc1825.txt,Aug 1995.
[Bel89] S.M. Bellovin. Security problems in the TCP/IP protocolsuite. Computer CommunicationReview, 19(2):32–48,
APR 1989.
[CA-98] CERT Advisory CA-98.01. ’Smurf’ IP Denial-of-Service Attacks. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-
98.01.smurf.html,January 1998.
6 May 2, 2000[CD97] H. Chang and D.Drew. DoSTracker. This was a publicallyavailable PERL script that attemptedto trace a denial-
of-service attack through a series of Cisco routers. It was released into the public domain, but later withdrawn.
Copies are still available on some websites. http://www.artsci.net/ jlinux/security/dostrack/, June 1997.
[KS94] G. Kessler and S. Shepard. RFC 1739: A primer on internet and tcp/ip tools. ftp://ftp.isi.edu/
in-notes/rfc1739.txt, Dec 1994.
[Lab] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Tcpdump. ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/tcpdump-3.4.tar.Z.
[Mor85] Robert T. Morris. A weakness in the 4.2BSD Unix TCP/IP software. Technical report, AT and T Bell Laborato-
ries, Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974, Feb 1985.
[MOT
+99] Glenn Mansﬁeld, Kohei Ohta, Y. Takei, N. Kato, and Y. Nemoto. Towards trapping wily intruders in the large.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, West Lafayette,
IN, USA, Sep 1999.
[Row99] Jeff Rowe. Intrusion detection and isolation protocol: Automated response to attacks. Talk presented at Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection Workshop, 1999, September 1999.
[SG98] Mike Schiffman and David Goldsmith. Firewalk. A publically available tool for doing traceroutes through
ﬁrewalls. Available at http://www.packetfactory.net/firewalk/.,Oct 1998.
[Ylo95] Tatu Ylonen. Secure shell man page. Available at http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh,Nov 1995.
7 May 2, 2000